LIFE  = LIFE: CORRECTING JUROR MISCONCEPTIONS by Jenio, Lisa M.
Capital Defense Journal
Volume 10 | Issue 1 Article 13
Fall 9-1-1997
"LIFE" = LIFE: CORRECTING JUROR
MISCONCEPTIONS
Lisa M. Jenio
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Capital Defense Journal by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lisa M. Jenio, "LIFE" = LIFE: CORRECTING JUROR MISCONCEPTIONS, 10 Cap. DEF J. 40 (1997).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj/vol10/iss1/13
Page 40 - Capital Defense Journal, Vol. 10, No. 1
those where the death penalty was sought. Dissatisfied with that
limitation, the Pirtle court concluded that the appropriate universe of
cases was that defined in Brett. In Brett, the court stated that the
appropriate pool of cases includes all death eligible cases, reasoning that
"[rIefocusing [proportionality] review to ascertain only whether a death
sentence is wanton and freakish based upon the broad range of aggra-
vated murder cases provides a more reliable and justifiable standard of
'disproportionality' and renders negligible the effect of slight deviations
in the universe of 'similar cases.'
72
The analysis by the Supreme Court of Washington regarding the
appropriate universe of cases for proportionality review is instructive.
73
It highlights the problems that arise when the pool of cases is limited to
those where the prosecutor proceeded capitally. These problems are
apparent in Virginia's proportionality review procedures. Because the
72 Brett, 892 P.2d at 69 (emphasis added). See also State v. Benn,
845 P.2d 289, 316 (Wash. 1993), where the court, in conducting an in-
depth proportionality review of defendant's case, stated that "[t]he pool
of 'similar cases' includes those cases in which the death penalty was
sought and those in which it was not;" and State v. Rupe, 743 P.2d 210,
229 (Wash. 1987) where the court, in comparing Rupe's case with cases
where death was not sought and those where the defendant pleaded
guilty, stated that "similar cases" includes "cases where the defendant
was convicted of first degree aggravated murder regardless of whether
the death penalty was sought."
73 Other states that consider all death-eligible cases when conduct-
ing proportionality review include Georgia and Nebraska. See Horton v.
State, 295 S.E.2d281,289n.9 (Ga. 1982)(stating that the court compares
"cases as to which the death penalty could have been sought by the
prosecutor but was not"); State v. Williams, 287 N.W.2d 18 (Neb.
1979)(relying on Georgia's review procedures in comparing "cases
involving crimes for which the death penalty is permissible"); and State
v. Moore, 316 N.W.2d 33, 44 (Neb. 1982)(comparing the records of all
convictions of first degree murder, inviting the defendant to provide it
with cases he wished the court to consider in its proportionality review).
Supreme Court of Virginia only reviews cases that resulted in capital
convictions, life cases that were based on similar fact patterns but were
not prosecuted as capital are excluded. Therefore, relevant life cases are
taken out ofproportionality review, skewing the review in favor of death.
Moreover, the due process concerns addressed by the district court in
Harris and Justice Utter's dissent in Brett arguably apply to the Virginia
statute.
V. Conclusion
Although it is unlikely that the Supreme Court of Virginia will
follow the lead of Washington and expand the universe of cases to
include those cases that could have been prosecuted as capital but were
not, defense counsel should still make the most of what the Virginia
statute and case law requires. There are two ways to accomplish this.
First, if counsel is presented with a capital case in which a sentence
of death is clearly excessive, he or she should prepare an exhibit of cases
involving similar fact patterns that did not result in a sentence of death.
This exhibit should be included with a motion to quash the capital
indictment and should be based on the inherent proportionality require-
ment contained within the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment. This is beneficial for at least two reasons. It
raises the proportionality issue at the trial level which could possibly
result in getting death out of the case. The exhibit also provides a ready-
made universe of cases that the Supreme Court of Virginia may be
willing to address on mandatory review.
Secondly, counsel should prepare an appendix to the appellant's
brief including other capital cases which demonstrate the excessiveness
of a sentence of death. By doing this, the appendix becomes part of the
record that will be reviewed by the federal courts in determining the
adequacy of the Supreme Court of Virginia's appellate review.
Regardless of which method is appropriate in the defendant's
situation, it is advisable that defense counsel play an active role in
proportionality review. Otherwise, it is a virtual guarantee that the
Supreme Court of Virginia will ignore its statutory duty to ensure that the
defendant's sentence of death is proportional.
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I. Introduction
In 1994, the Virginia legislature abolished parole for capital of-
fenses committed after January 1, 19 95 .1 However, a number of studies
have shown that the average layperson believes that a capital defendant,
if sentenced to life imprisonment, will serve only a few years in prison
before being released on parole.2 In order to combat such misconcep-
tions, itis essentialthat defense counselintroduce evidence ofadefendant's
1 Va. Code § 53.1-165.1 (Supp. 1994). In pertinent part, § 53.1-
165.1 provides that" [a]ny person sentenced to a term of incarceration for
a felony offense committed on or after January 1, 1995, shall not be
eligible for parole upon that offense."
2 See infra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
parole ineligibility at trial. Parole ineligibility evidence may be intro-
duced for two purposes: 1) to rebut evidence of future dangerousness,
and 2) to mitigate the offense.
In Simmons v. South Carolina the United States Supreme Court
explicitly recognized that a defendant has a constitutional right to
introduce evidence of his or her parole ineligibility to rebut evidence of
future dangerousness offered by the prosecution. However, even when
the Commonwealth does not rely specifically on the future dangerous-
ness aggravating factor, defense counsel in Virginia should argue that
evidence of parole ineligibility is admissible based upon: (1) the Four-
teenth Amendment due process right to rebut the Commonwealth's case
for death, as any proof of vileness necessarily implicates future danger-
3 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
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ousness, and because juries will inevitably consider future dangerous-
ness when making the sentencing decision, and (2) the Eighth Amend-
ment right to introduce any relevanteviderce in mitigation of the offense,
based upon the constitutional concerns for individualized sentencing
decisions and reliability in such decisions.
II. A Bit of Background
A. About Juror Misconceptions: What Does a "Life"
Sentence Really Mean?
After finding a defendant guilty of a capital offense, a Virginia jury
must decide whether to sentence the defendant to death or to "life" in
prison.4 Ajury's awareness about a defendant's eligibility forparole can
have a profound effect on the sentence that it imposes on the defendant.
Researchers have found that the number of years a jury believes a
defendant will actually serve if sentenced to life is a vital factor in the
jury's decision to choose life imprisonment instead of the death penalty.
5
Studies have also demonstrated that potential jurors may labor
under misconceptions regarding parole eligibility. For example, a
comprehensive survey of the residents of Prince Edward County, Vir-
ginia, revealed that such residents believed that a capital defendant
sentenced to life imprisonment would serve only ten years in prison
before being released on parole.
6
Such juror confusion is especially disturbing in the light of the
numerous instances in which Virginia jurors have interrupted their
deliberations to ask the trial court for clarification on the meaning of "life
imprisonment," and the trial court has refused to directly answer their
question. Rather, in response to such juror questions, the court has
4 Unlike a number of other states (Alabama, Arkansas, California,
Connecticut, Delaware, Louisiana, Missouri, New Hampshire, and
Washington) which identify the jury's options as "life without parole"
or "death," Virginia juries are instructed that their sentencing options are
"life" or "death."
5 See Simmons, 512 U.S. at 159 (citing study in which more than
75% of South Carolina citizens indicated that the amount of time the
convicted murderer actually would have to spend in prison would be an
"extremely important" or "very important" factor in choosing between
life and death). See also Luginbuhl and Howe, Discretion in Capital
Sentencing Instructions: Guided orMisguided?, 70 Ind. L.J. 1161,1178
(1995) (study of North Carolina jurors revealed that of jurors who
sentenced defendant to death, 74% believed that he would serve less than
20 years, whereas of jurors who sentenced defendant to life, 72%
believed that he would remain in prison for at least 20 years); Eisenberg
and Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions in Capital Cases, 79
Cornell L. Rev. 1, 7 (1993) ("[I]urors who believe the alternative to death
is a relatively short time in prison tend to sentence to death. Jurors who
believe the alternative treatment is longer tend to sentence to life.");
Paduano and Smith, Deathly Errors: Juror Misperceptions Concerning
Parole in the Imposition of the Death Penalty, 18 Colum. Hum. Rts. L.
Rev. 211, 220-25 (1987) (recounting study of potential Georgia capital
jurors in which over two-thirds indicated that they would be more likely
to impose a sentence of life if assured that "life" meant at least twenty-
five years).
6 See Hood, The Meaning Of "Life" For Virginia Jurors And Its
Effect On Reliability In Capital Sentencing, 75 Va. L. Rev. 1605, 1606
(1989) (citing National Legal Research Group, Inc. Jury Research and
Trial Simulation Services, Report on Jurors' Attitudes Concerning the
DeathPenalty (Dec. 6,1988)). Although, atthe time of the survey, parole
remained available for some capital defendants in Virginia (those who
had not been previously convicted of two other felony offenses), such
defendants would not be eligible until he or she served at least 25 years.
See Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-151(C) (1988).
usually asserted that what might happen in the future "should be of no
concern" to them.7 This disturbing phenomenon is not particular to
Virginia juries. For example, the South Carolina jury in Simmons itself
sent a note to the judge asking if a life sentence carried with it the
possibility of parole.8 Furthermore, a survey of all Georgia capital cases
in which a death sentence was imposed from 1973 to 1990 indicated that
Georgia sentencing juries asked questions about the defendant's poten-
tial parole eligibility on a life sentence in twenty-five percent of the
cases. 9 Because juries are not necessarily informed of their right to ask
questions, the survey results likely underestimate the extent of juror
concern about parole eligibility in capital cases. As noted by one
commentator,"' [i]t cannot be said... that the possibility of parole is not
being considered in those cases where a question is not posed.. . .-It
appears likely that in all but the most extraordinarily heinous capital
murder case, parole is a factor in the jury's deliberations.' 10
Prior to Simmons, the United States Supreme Court provided little
guidance as to what parole information was proper for ajury to consider.
Although common sense might indicate that a jury should always be
informed of a defendant's parole eligibility, the Supreme Court generally
left this determination to the states, 11 thereby implicitly allowing State
trial courts to evade juror questions regarding what "life" imprisonment
really means. It was in the face of such juror confusion and trial court
evasion that the Supreme Court decided Simmons v. South Carolina.
B. Simmons v. South Carolina
Simmons was charged with the first-degree murder of an elderly
woman. Under South Carolina law, Simmons was ineligible for parole
if convicted because hehad confessed to sexually and physically assault-
ing elderly women on threeprior occasions. The jury convicted Simmons
of first-degree murder, thereby rendering him ineligible for parole.
12
7 See, e.g., Delong v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 357,370,362 S.E.2d
669, 776 (1987); Poyner v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 401, 432, 329
S.E.2d 815, 836 (1985); Peterson v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 289,296-
97,302 S.E.2d 520, 525 (1983); Clanton v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 41,
54-55,286 S.E.2d 172,179-80 (1982); Clarkv. Commonwealth, 220 Va.
201,214,257 S.E.2d 784,792 (1979); Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220
Va. 260,278,257 S.E.2d 808, 821 (1979); Jones v. Commonwealth,
194 Va. 273, 275, 72 S.E.2d 693, 694 (1952).
8 See infra note 15 and accompanying text.
9 Lane, "Is There Life Without Parole?": A Capital Defendant's
Right To A Meaningful Alternative Sentence, 26 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 327,
335 (1993). This study involved the review of every Georgia trial during
the 17-year period in which a death sentence was returned by a jury, and
for which transcripts were available. Specifically, of the 280 trials
reviewed, 70 of the resulting death sentences were returned following
jury questions to the court regarding the nature of the life sentence and
the possibility of release on parole. Id. at 335-36.
10 Lane, 26 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. at 336 (quoting Paduano and Smith,
Deathly Errors: Juror Misperceptions Concerning Parole in the Impo-
sition of the Death Penalty, 18 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 211,237, n. 91
(1987)).
11 See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983) (upholding ajury
instruction that informed jurors of the California governor's power to
commute a life sentence without possibility of parole to a lesser sentence
that included the possibility of parole). As the Court acknowledged in
Simmons, Ramos is generally cited for the proposition that the Court will
generally "[d]efer to a State's determination as to what ajury should and
should not be told about sentencing." Simmons, 512 U.S. at 168.
12 Simmons, 512 U.S. at 156.
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During the sentencing phase, the prosecutor urged the jury to
consider Simmons' future dangerousness in deciding his punishment.
Specifically, the prosecutor argued that the "question for thejury ... was
'what to do with [petitioner] now that he is in our midst."' He added that
a death sentence "would be a response of society to someone who is a
threat. Yourverdictwillbean actof self-defense." 13 Simmons'counsel
requested a jury instruction explaining that a life sentence meant that
Simmons could not be released on parole, but the judge refused. 
14
After ninetyminutes of deliberation, the jury sent anote to the judge
asking: "Does the imposition of a life sentence carry with it the possibil-
ity of parole?" The judge replied that parole was not an issue for the jury
to consider and that"[t]he terms lifeimprisonment and death sentence are
to be understood in their plan [sic] and ordinary meaning." Twenty-five
minutes later, the jury returned a sentence of death.
15
Writing for a plurality, Justice Blackmun overturned Simmons'
conviction on Fourteenth Amendment due process grounds, stating that
"where the defendant's future dangerousness is at issue, and state law
prohibits the defendant's release on parole, due process requires that the
sentencing jury be informed that the defendant is parole ineligible.' '16 In
so holding, the plurality concluded that Simmons had been sentenced to
death on the basis of information which he had no opportunity to "deny
or explain" in violation of the due process clause and the principles
enunciated in Gardner v. Florida17 and Skipper v. South Carolina.18
Justice Blackmun reasoned that Simmons was sentenced to death, at least
in part, on the basis of the prosecution's future dangerousness arguments
which the defendant had no opportunity to rebut. 19
C. Post-Simmons Cases in Virginia
For offenses committed after January 1, 1995, the Supreme Court
of Virginia has recognized that Simmons requires jury instructions on
parole ineligibility whenever future dangerousness is "an issue in the
sentencing phase" of a capital murder case.20 However, it appears that
future dangerousness is only "an issue" to the Supreme Court of Virginia
when the Commonwealth relies on the future dangerousness aggravating
factor in making its case for death. Thus far, the court has acknowledged
the necessity of a Simmons' instruction only in cases where the prosecu-
tion has sought and secured a death sentence on the basis of future
dangerousness.
13 Id. at 157.
14 1d. at 158, 160.
'51d. at 160.
16 Simmons, 512 U.S. at 156.
17 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (invalidating a death sentence where the
defendant was sentenced to death on the basis of a presentence report
which was not made available to him and which he therefore could not
rebut, and explaining that sending a man to his death "on the basis of
information which he had no opportunity to deny or explain" violated
fundamental notions of due process).
18 476 U.S. 1 (1986) (invalidating a death sentence where the trial
court refused to admit evidence of the defendant's good behavior in
prison during the penalty phase, and explaining that where the prosecu-
tion relies on a prediction of future dangerousness in requesting the death
penalty, elemental due process principles operate to require admission of
the defendant's relevant evidence in rebuttal).
19 Simmons, 512 U.S. at 164-66.
20 See Mickens v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 423,425,457 S.E.2d 9,
10 (1995); Ramdass v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 518, 520, 450 S.E.2d
360,361 (1994); Wrightv. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 485,487, 450 S.E.2d
361,362(1994). Although the offenses inMickens,Ramdass and Wright
were committed prior to January 1, 1995, the court acknowledged that a
Simmons instruction is mandated where the defendant is parole ineligible
and where future dangerousness is an issue in sentencing.
II. Extending Simmons to Cases Where the Commonwealth
Does Not Specifically Rely on Future Dangerousness
Simmons stands for the proposition that a defendant has a Four-
teenth Amendment due process right to rebut the Commonwealth's case
for death.2 1 Even when the Commonwealth does not specifically rely
on the future dangerousness aggravating factor in making its case for
death, defense counsel in Virginia should argue that the defendant retains
his or her due process right to introduce evidence of parole ineligibility
to rebut the Commonwealth's case for death on two bases: 1) a
defendant's potential for future dangerousness is always an implicit
aggravating factor when a death sentence is being considered, and 2) any
evidence used to show vileness will inevitably impress future dangerous-
ness upon the jury.
A. Future Dangerousness is Always a Factor in Sentencing
As community members themselves, jurors will be instinctively
concerned that a defendant will be a threat to society. Even where the
state asserts a reliance upon another predicate, such as vileness, a jury
choosing between a prison sentence and a death sentence will invariably
focus upon whether the defendant will continue to commitviolent crimes
if released from prison. Parole eligibility is a factor very much on the
minds of capital juries, and it often forms the basis of their sentencing
decisions. 22 As such, the possibility of parole from a life sentence- or
at least the belief in such a possibility- operates as a silent aggravating
circumstance in many capital sentencing proceedings, and often may be
the decisive factor underlying a jury's decision to sentence a defendant
to death.
Given that sentencing jurors will inevitably consider the propensity
and ability of the defendant to commit future crimes regardless of
whether the Commonwealth specifically asks them to find future danger-
ousness, defense counsel must vigorously argue that the defendant has a
Fourteenth Amendment due process right to rebut such jury consider-
ations of future dangerousness. Support for this argument is found in
Simmons itself, where future dangerousness was not a statutory aggra-
vating factor necessary to establish death eligibility but the Court found
that it became an issue through the remarks of the prosecutor. Thus, the
direct command of Simmons is that information regarding parole should
be allowed whenever future danger is an issue, not only when it is
formally relied upon as an aggravating factor. 23
B. Vileness and Future Dangerousness Predicates are
Inextricably Interwoven
In construing Virginia Code Section 19.2-264.4(C), 24 the Supreme
Court of Virginia has recognized that the future dangerousness and
21 Significantly, unlike the Virginia sentencing scheme, "future
dangerousness" is not a statutory aggravating factor in South Carolina.
In Simmons, the prosecutor made only generalized arguments about
Simmons' future dangerousness; he did not explicitly argue to the jury
that Simmons would kill again if they did not give him the death penalty.
22 See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text.
23 Thus, Simmons is arguably applicable in any case where the
prosecution presents evidence of the defendant's past crimes, even if the
Commonwealth has not chosen to rely on future dangerousness as an
aggravating factor.
24 Va. Code § 19.2-264.4(C) provides that "[tihe penalty of death
shall not be imposed unless the Commonwealth shall prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that there is a probability based upon evidence of the
prior history of the defendant or of the circumstances surrounding the
commission of the offense of which he is accused that he would commit
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat
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vileness predicates are inextricably interwoven by concluding that
evidence which is used to show vileness may also be relied upon in
finding future dangerousness. In Edmonds v. Commonwealth,2 5 for
example, the Supreme Court of Virginia stated that, in determining future
dangerousness, the factfinder may rely upon "the circumstances sur-
rounding the commission of the offense" and the "heinousness of the
crime."'26 Invariably, these are the same facts used to show vileness.
In addition to permitting the jury to consider the circumstances
surrounding the crime along with other evidence in finding future
dangerousness, the Supreme Court of Virginia has gone one step further,
holding that a finding of future dangerousness may be based solely upon
the circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime. In Roach
v. Commonwealth,27 for example, the court upheld a death sentence after
striking the vileness predicate for insufficient evidence. In so doing, the
court emphasized that the facts and circumstances surrounding the
murder alone may be sufficient to support a finding of future dangerous-
ness, even when those same facts are insufficient to support a finding of
vileness.
28
Thus, the Commonwealth may rely upon "vileness" evidence to
convince the jury that the defendant will be dangerous, because, as
applied by the Supreme Court of Virginia, the future dangerousness
aggravator explicitly has a vileness component. Given such precedent,
defense counsel should argue that the defendant retains his or her
Fourteenth Amendment due process right to rebut the Commonwealth's
case for death- and thereby has the right to present evidence of his or
her parole ineligibility- even if the Commonwealth chooses only to
present evidence related to vileness, because the evidence used to show
vileness will inevitably impress future dangerousness upon the jury.
After all, how can a jury, which is asked to judge whether a defendant
who acted with "depravity of mind" in a manner that was "outrageously
vile, horrible or inhuman," be expected to disregard whether such a
person would pose a future threat?
IV. Eighth Amendment Right to Introduce Mitigating Evidence
Includes Evidence of Parole Ineligibility
In Jurek v. Texas,29 the United States Supreme Court held that in
order to comport with the individualized sentencing determination as
to society, orthathis conductin committing the offense was outrageously
or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman, in that it involved torture,
depravity of mind or aggravated battery to the victim."
25 229 Va. 303, 329 S.E.2d 807, cert denied, 475 U.S. 975 (1985).
26 Edmonds, 229 Va. at 312, 329 S.E.2d at 813. See also Royal v.
Commonwealth, 250 Va. 110, 458 S.E.2d 575 (1995) (holding that the
circumstances of the crime may appropriately be considered when
determining whether the statutory predicate of future dangerousness
exists); DeLong v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 357, 371,362 S.E.2d 669,
677 (1987) (holding that "[i]n deciding whether a defendant constitutes
a future danger to society, ajury is permitted to consider his prior history
and, in addition or in the alternative, the circumstances surrounding the
commission of the offense"); Frye v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 370,345
S.E.2d267 (1986) (holding thatcircumstances of the crime and defendant's
lack of remorse are proper factors to be considered on the issue of the
probability that defendant will constitute a continuing serious threat to
society).
27 251 Va. 324,468 S.E.2d 98, cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 365 (1996).
28 251 Va. at 348,468 S.E.2d at 112. See also Murphy v. Common-
wealth, 246 Va. 136, 431 S.E.2d 48 (1993) (permitting the jury to find
future dangerousness from the circumstances surrounding the offense
rather than the defendant's history).
29 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments,30 "[a] jurymust be
allowed to consider on the basis of all relevant evidence not only why a
death sentence should be imposed, but also why it should not be
imposed." 31 In Lockett v. Ohio,32 the Court took its holding in Jurek a
step further, establishing that a defendant's right to present mitigating
evidence in the penalty phase is guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment.
33
In an oft-quoted passage, the Lockett Court stated that
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the
sentencer . . . not be precluded from considering, as a
mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or
record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the
defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.
34
Lockett and its progeny explicitly prohibit states from "limiting the
sentencer's consideration of any relevant circumstance that could cause
it to decline to impose the death penalty.' 35 UnderLockett, then, a state
statutory scheme must allow the sentencer to hear, consider, and give full
effect to all relevant mitigating evidence, a mandate which is satisfied by
the language of Virginia Code Section 19.2-264A13) 36 as well as the
cases interpreting this statute.
37
The only limitation imposed by the Supreme Court on mitigating
evidence is that it notbe "[irrelevant] evidence concerning otherpersons,
crimes, and events [that are] completely distinct.' 38 This limitation does
not prohibit parole ineligibility evidence because such evidence is
relevant under Lockett. First, in its determination of the appropriate
penalty, a jury would be aided by information which accurately de-
30 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
31Jurek, 428 U.S. at 271.
32438 U.S. 586 (1978).
33 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604.
34438 U.S. at 604 (emphasis in original).
35 McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 306 (1987). See also Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (vacating a death sentence when the jury
was not instructed that it could give effect to all mitigating circum-
stances, including nonstatutory evidence of defendant's mental retarda-
tion and abused childhood); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987)
(holding that exclusion of evidence of defendant's family background
and capacity for rehabilitation was unconstitutional); Skipper v. Okla-
homa, 476 U.S. 1 (1986) (holding that exclusion of evidence regarding
defendant's good behavior while incarcerated after arrest deprived
defendant of his right to place relevant evidence in mitigation of
punishment before the sentencer); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104
(1982) (reversing death sentence where the sentencing judge refused to
consider nonstatutory mitigating evidence of defendant's emotional
disturbance, turbulent family history and beatings by a harsh father).
36 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(B) provides, in relevant part
"[e]vidence which may be admissible... may include the circumstances
surrounding the offense, the history and background of the defendant,
and any other facts in mitigation of the offense. Facts in mitigation
may include, but shall not be limited to, the following: [defendant has
no significant criminal history; capital offense was committed while
defendant under extreme mental disturbance/distress; victim was a
participant in/consented to the defendant's conduct; insanity of the
defendant at time of offense; age of defendant; or mental retardation of
defendant]." (emphasis added).
37 See, e.g., Briley v. Bass, 750 F.2d 1238 (4th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1088 (1985) (holding that although section 264.4(B)
lists five nonexclusive mitigating circumstances, the defense is permit-
ted to introduce any evidence relevant to the penalty decision, including
the circumstances surrounding the offense, the history and background
of the defendant, and other facts in mitigation of the offense).
38 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604.
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scribes the legal and practical effects of a life sentence, thereby making
the existence of an appropriate alternative sentence a relevant mitigating
factor. Capital juries have often evidenced their desire for accurate
information about parole eligibility by interrupting their sentencing
deliberations to inquire of the judge what a "life" sentence really
means.
39
Second, the parole eligibility of a capital defendant is undoubtedly
a relevant mitigating factor relating to the defendant's offense. A life
sentence without the possibility of parole is a severe and adequate
punishment for the defendant's offense, but the jury may not render a life
sentence unless it knows that the defendant is never eligible for parole.
Furthermore, such evidence is relevantbecause it counters common juror
misconceptions concerning the length of life imprisonment.
40
Third, evidence of parole ineligibility is relevant because it miti-
gates a death sentence by providing affirmative evidence that the
defendant does not pose a future threat to society. In Skipper v. South
Carolina,41 the United States Supreme Court explicitly recognized that
evidence of a defendant's lack of future dangerousness qualifies as
mitigation in the penalty phase of a trial.42 Because incarceration
substantially reduces a defendant's future dangerousness to society, such
evidence must be considered as mitigating evidence which may not be
excluded from the sentencer's consideration. 43
Thus far, no court has found parole ineligibility to be irrelevant as
mitigating evidence under Lockett. Rather, the courts that have applied
Lockett to exclude evidence as irrelevant to "any aspect of defendant's
character or record" or to the "circumstances of the offense" have
excluded the following types of evidence: the effect of a defendant's
incarceration upon relatives; 44 testimony regarding defendant's dys-
lexia;45 testimony by the victim's sister that she did not wish the jury to
impose the death penalty;46 evidence of a plea bargain and sentencing
agreement between the State and a codefendant;47 and evidence that a co-
defendant was ineligible for the death penalty.4 8 Thus far, the courts
have refused to admit evidence of parole eligibility under Simmons only
in cases where the defendant is not technically ineligible for parole.
49
On the other hand, no court has explicitly held that evidence of
parole ineligibility is constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence under
the principles of Lockett. In other words, no court has taken the next step
after Simmons to hold that parole ineligibility evidence is relevant
mitigating evidence when the prosecution chooses not to rely on or to
raise future dangerousness. However, in a somewhat obscure footnote
39 See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
40 See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
41476 U.S. 1 (1985).
42 Skipper, 476 U.S. at 5.
43 Such an argumentis supported by the language of Simmons itself,
where, after citing to Lockett, the Court stated, "In assessing future
dangerousness, the actual duration of the defendant's prison sentence is
indisputably relevant. Holding all other factors constant, it is entirely
reasonable for a sentencing jury to view a defendant who is eligible for
parole as a greater threat to society than a defendant who is not. Indeed,
there may be no greater assurance of a defendant's future
nondangerousness to the public than the fact that he will never be
released on parole." Simmons, 512 U.S. at 163-64 (emphasis added).
44 Coppola v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 243, 253, 257 S.E.2d 797,
804 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1103 (1980).
45Madden v. Collins, 18 F.3d304, 308 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 1114 (1995).
46 Robison v. Maynard, 943 F.2d 1216, 1217-18 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 970 (1991).
47 State v. Irwin, 282 S.E.2d 439, 447 (N.C. 1981).
48 State v. Bond, 478 S.E.2d 163, 180-81 (N.C. 1996).
49 See, e.g., Allridge v. Scott, 41 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 1994).
in Turnerv. Williams,50 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated
that
The Supreme Court... has made clear that a sentencer may not
be precluded from considering, and therefore basing a life
sentence on, any mitigating evidence- even when there is
no direct relationship between that evidence and the estab-
lished aggravating factor(s).
5 1
Although the evidence at issue in Turner had nothing to do with parole
(in)eligibility, defense counsel in Virginia should employ the Turner
footnote to argue that parole ineligibility evidence constitutes relevant
mitigating evidence underLockett, regardless of whether there is a direct
relationship between that evidence and the established aggravating
factor- in this instance, vileness.
Thus, even when the Commonwealth does not purport to rely upon
future dangerousness as an aggravating factor, defense counsel should
argue that the defendant has a right to introduce evidence of parole
ineligibility as a constitutionally relevant mitigating factor pursuant to
the principles of Lockett, its progeny, the Fourth Circuit's interpretation
of Lockett, and the language and interpretation of Virginia Code Section
19.2-264.4(B).
V. Eighth Amendment Requirement of Heightened Reliability
Necessitates the Introduction of Parole Ineligibility Evidence
Prior to 1972, capital sentencers were allowed unbridled discretion
to impose the death penalty once the defendant's guilt had been estab-
lished.52 However, because such discretion often resulted in inconsis-
tent and passion-based sentences, 53 the Supreme Court held in Furman
v. Georgia54 that a sentencer could not impose the death penalty under
procedures creating a substantial risk of arbitrary and capricious action.
In Gregg v. Georgia,55 the first death penalty decision after Furman,
Justice Stewart expanded upon such principles, stating that "accurate
sentencing information is an indispensable prerequisite to a reasoned
determination of whether a defendant shall live or die by ajury of people
who may never before have made a sentencing decision.
'56
Recognizing the irrevocability of the deathpenalty and the arbitrari-
ness with which unguided sentencers might impose it, the Supreme Court
has construed the Eighth Amendment to require a "heightened standard
'for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punish-
ment in a specific case.' 57 In nearly every case of the post-Furman era,
the Court has stressed the need for reliability in sentencing, 58 emphasiz-
50 35 F.3d 872 (4th Cir. 1994).
51 Turner, 35 F.3dat 903, n. 25 (citingHitchcockv. Dugger, Skipper
v. South Carolina, Eddings v. Oklahoma and Lockett v. Ohio) (emphasis
added).
52 Lane, "Is There Life Without Parole?": A Capital Defendant's
Right to a Meaningful Alternative Sentence, 26 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 327,
327 (1993).
53 Id.
54408 U.S. 238 (1972).
55 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
56 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 190 (emphasis added).
57 Simmons, 512 U.S. at 172 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) ("Death, in its
finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term
differs from one of only a year or two.")
58 See, e.g., Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988) (holding
that a death sentence based upon the jury's finding that a murder was
"especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" cannot stand where the trial
court failed to guide the jurors in theirinterpretation of such words); Mills
v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988) (holding that a death sentence must
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ing the importance of channeling the sentencer's discretion so as to
minimize the "risk that 'the death penalty [may have been] meted out
arbitrarily or capriciously' or through 'whim... or mistake.' 59 Based
upon such principles, defense counsel in Virginia should argue that a
defendant has an Eighth Amendment right to introduce evidence of his
or her parole ineligibility- regardless of whether the Commonwealth
argues future dangerousness- in order to minimize the risk that the
death penalty is imposed on the basis of juror misconceptions about
parole law.
In concurring with the plurality's decision in Simmons that the
defendant was entitled to present evidence of his or her parole ineligibil-
ity, Justice Souter wrote separately to emphasize his belief that such an
outcome was also mandated by the Eighth Amendment because it
requires a heightened standard of reliability in capital cases. As part of
this heightened standard, jurors must fully comprehend their sentencing
options. However, as recognized by the plurality in Simmons, most juries
lack accurate information about the precise meaning of a sentence of life
imprisonment, and many surveys support the notion that there is a
reasonable likelihood of juror confusion about the meaning of a "life"
sentence.60 Most importantly, the studies demonstrate that potential
jurors often believe that a defendant sentenced to life imprisonment will
be in prison for a much shorter period of time than is actually the case.
61
Furthermore, the studies reveal that parole eligibility and the likely
period of incarceration are key factors for jurors in determining a
sentence.
62
The Supreme Court has emphasized that reliability is a requirement
which compels the court to err on the side of giving the jury more
information rather than less.63 Furthermore, the requirement of reliabil-
be vacated if the jurors erroneously believed that, in order to give a
mitigating factor any weight, they had to agree unanimously on the
existence of the factor); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980) (holding
that a death sentence cannot stand if the jury was misled to believe that
it had no alternative but to convict the defendant of capital murder
although the evidence might have supported a conviction for the lesser
included offense of felony-murder).
59 Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320,343 (1985) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (quoting California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 999 (1983)).
60 Simmons, 512 U.S. at 169, 170. See supra notes 5-7 and
accompanying text.
61 See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
62Id.
63 California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1001 (1983).
ity in sentencing has provided the foundation upon which the Court has
structured the right to introduce all relevant evidence in mitigation.64 In
order to satisfy the constitutional mandate of reliability in the capital
sentencing decision, defense counsel should therefore argue that the
defendant has an Eighth Amendment right to introduce evidence of his
or her parole ineligibility to the jury- regardless of whether the
Commonwealth argues future dangerousness as a predicate to the death
sentence. Allowing jurors to operate under their misconceptions and
misinformation onparole in assessing the appropriate punishment of life
or death offers no reliability in sentencing and as such is in violation of
the Eighth Amendment.
VI. Conclusion
The Virginia legislature abolished parole for those convicted of
capital murder two years ago. However, when defense counsel does not
seek the introduction of parole ineligibility evidence or an instruction
regarding parole ineligibility, and when the Commonwealth does not
argue future dangerousness, Virginia judges continue to instruct sentenc-
ing juries that their choice is between "life" and "death," not between
"life without the possibility of parole" and "death." Given the probabil-
ity that most potential Virginia jurors continue to labor under the
misconception that a life sentence does not mean "life" imprisonment, it
is imperative that defense counsel insist upon the introduction of parole
ineligibility evidence in the sentencing phase of any capital trial, regard-
less of which aggravating factor(s) are argued by the Commonwealth.
Given the common sense emphasis that jurors place upon the length of
the defendant's probable incarceration, any evidence that the defendant
will never be released from prison could, quite literally, mean the
difference between alife sentence and a death sentence for the defendant.
64 See, e.g., Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604-05. In holding that the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer be allowed to
consider all relevant mitigating evidence, the Court reviewed the hold-
ings in Furman and Woodson, stating "[wle are satisfied that this
qualitative difference between death and other penalties calls for a
greater degree of reliability when the death sentence is imposed." Id. at
604.
RESURRECTING THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE IN VIRGINIA
BY: JOSEPH D. PLATANIA
I. Introduction
Frequently, in capital murder trials, the Commonwealth attempts to
introduce codefendant's statements that inculpate the defendant as the
triggerman. Virginia trial courts sometimes find this evidence admis-
sible under the against interest exception to the hearsay rule, arguably
violating the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights of confrontation and
cross-examination. This article examines whatthe Confrontation Clause
of the Sixth Amendment provides, how it is affected by hearsay excep-
tions, and where its future lies as a constitutional doctrine. Although
courts do not necessarily apply the language of the Confrontation Clause
literally, it still affords significant protections to defendants who know
how to utilize it properly.
II. The Confrontation Clause: What It Is
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that "[iln all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall... be confronted
